Tag Archives: Viktor Orban

The EU funds, Viktor Orbán, and Lőrinc Mészáros, the Hungarian gas fitter: four graphs

Research Notes, Short PapersEU funds, Hungary, last digits test, Lőrinc Mészáros, price distortion, public procurement, Viktor Orban

March 8, 2019

CRCB. 2019. The EU funds, Viktor Orbán and the performance of firms owned by Lőrinc Mészáros, the Hungarian gas fitter, in the Hungarian public tenders 2005-2018. Budapest: CRCB.

Based on the empirical analysis of the Hungarian public tenders we pointed out that the EU funding has perverse effects in Hungary: it helps to reduce the intensity of competition, to increase the level of corruption risk and the weight of price distortion, and it generated the growth of the estimated direct social loss due to weak competition and high level of corruption risks from 2009 to 2016. The analysis on public tenders won by read more

In the footsteps of a kleptocratic state. A presentation at the Budapest Science Meetup

Presentations, Publicationscorruption risk, political corruption, public procurement, Viktor Orban

9 November 2017

Budapest Science Meetup, Library of the Hungarian Academy of Science, 7pm

In the presentation we dealt with the effect of friendship and family ties with the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orban) on the intensity of competition of public tenders won by companies owned by his close friends and family members. The analysis is based on more than 151,000 Hungarian public procurement tenders in the period of 2009-2016. Using OLS and ordered logit estimation and propensity score read more

Competitive intensity and family business

Publications, Research Notes, Short Paperscompetitive intensity, crony capitalism, estimation, Hungary, public procurement, Viktor Orban

30 May 2017

In these short papers we analyse the effect of friendship and family ties with the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orban) on the competitive intensity of public tenders won by companies owned by his close friends and family members. The analysis is based on more than 151,000 Hungarian public procurement tenders in the period of 2009-2016. Using OLS and ordered logit estimations, we estimate the effect of the friendship and family ties on the competitive intensity of tenders. The results point out read more