February 19, 2024
CRCB. 2024. Two Communication Companies in the Hungarian Public Procurement Market 2012-2023. CRCB Research Notes: 2024:1, CRCB.
Research Notes: 2024:1 (PDF)
The analyzed database (CSV)
Tag Archives: political favoritism
Haveri cégek az Orbán rendszerben: árbevétel, profit, hozzáadott érték és osztalékfizetés
December 29, 2021
Tóth, I. J. és Hajdu, M. 2021. Haveri cégek az Orbán rendszerben: árbevétel, profit, hozzáadott érték és osztalékfizetés. Magyarországon 2005-2018 között nagy összegű közbeszerzési szerződéseket nyerő cégek mérlegadatainak elemzése. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:2. Budapest: CRCB.
Tóth, I. J. & Hajdu, M. 2021. Crony companies in the Orbán regime: net turnover, profit, value-added and dividend payments. Analysis of balance sheet data of companies winning large public procurement contracts in Hungary from 2005 to 2018. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:2. Budapest: CRCB.
Össszefoglalás
A tanulmányban 2004 és 2018 között read more
Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning
November 30, 2021
Tóth, I. J. and Hajdu, M. 2021. Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:1. Budapest: CRCB.
The paper investigates the crony system in Hungary based on data of more than 227,000 public tenders from 2005 to 2020. The paper’s novelty is the analysis of odds of winning of crony and ordinary companies in public procurement that is a new approach to measure the strength of read more
Orban’s cronies in the Hungarian public tenders in construction, 2005-2020
Cronyism in Hungary. Empirical analysis of public tenders 2010-2016
21 February 2018.
Presentation at the conference “János Kornai 90th birthday ” at Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest,
21-22 February 2018
Abstract
In this paper, we use the public procurement database which contains data from more than 230,000 public tenders from 1997 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the analysis is public tenders (without framework agreements) won by companies related to cronies and read more
How does the Kleptocratic State Work in Hungary?
István János Tóth – Miklós Hajdu: How does the Kleptocratic State Work in Hungary? A research note based on Hungarian public procurement data. CRCB, Budapest, January 2018.
26 January 2018
In this research note, we use the public procurement database built by CRCB, which contains data from more than 200,000 public tenders from 1997 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the analysis is public tenders (without framework agreements) won by companies related to cronies and read more
Analysing corruption as black holes – a study on Hungarian public procurement
22 June 2017
Presentation for a meeting in the building of EU Commission, Brussels. The presentation deals with three issues. (1) It presents the analytical framework of corruption risks and competititon intensity of public tenders used by CRCB; (2) it deals with the results of report “Intensity of Competition, Corruption Risks and Price Distortion in the Hungarian Public Procurement – 2009-2016″ made by CRCB for the European Commission; (3) and it demonstrates some preliminary results on read more
Rent Extraction and the Rule of Law. The Case of Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law
This research note examines the history and background of the Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law. We conclude that the residence bond legislation is an example of the violation of the rule of law, of its connection with rent-seeking, and of possible appearance of political corruption. This case is a clear manifestation of what form, what special means, and what consequences political favoritism can have and can operate with in a given read more